manual-temp-dir
Referencetemp file removed and re-created as a directory
suspicious · warning · stable · since 1.0 · fix: sometimes · on by default
Filename.temp_file creates the file exclusively — that exclusivity
is its entire security contract. Removing the file and re-creating its
name as a directory forfeits it: between the remove and the mkdir any
other process can claim the now-predictable path in a shared temp
directory (CWE-377), making the mkdir fail — or succeed inside an
attacker-provided symlinked parent where the temp directory is shared.
Filename.temp_dir (stdlib since 5.1, always inside the support
window) is the atomic, dedicated form.
(* bad *) let d = Filename.temp_file p "" in Sys.remove d; Sys.mkdir d 0o700; ...(* good *) let d = Filename.temp_dir p "" in ...Fires on the three-step sequence: a binding of a Filename.temp_file
application (the omitted ?temp_dir is tolerated) whose body removes
the bound path (Sys.remove or Unix.unlink) and then — directly, or
after one intervening statement — re-creates
it with Unix.mkdir or Sys.mkdir. Path identity is the bound
declaration’s, never spelling: removing or making some other path
never counts. Anchored at the temp_file application. The fix
rewrites the direct shape to Filename.temp_dir, dropping the remove
and mkdir statements, when the unit is not preprocessed, the callee is
spelled exactly Filename.temp_file, the argument gaps are pure
whitespace (a written ~temp_dir: refuses), the permission argument
is an integer literal (carried as ~perms: unless it is 0o700,
temp_dir’s default), the mkdir is followed by further statements
(so the binding still binds a path the rest uses), and no comment sits
in the deleted region. Any refused gate refuses the fix, never the
finding. The fix is safe where Filename is the standard library’s, and unsafe,
applied only under --unsafe, otherwise. The sequence split across helper functions is a documented
false negative.

